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51 
GRIDLOCK?† 
Josh Chafetz∗ 
Its title notwithstanding, Professor Josh Blackman’s Comment1 is 
not really about gridlock.  It makes no attempt to ask what constitutes 
gridlock or how we might identify it,2 nor does it offer much by way of 
a theory of how we ought to respond to gridlock, if indeed we are  
experiencing it.  Instead, Blackman takes the opportunity presented  
by two recent executive actions of which he disapproves to advance  
a certain theory of administrative law, one in which the “major ques-
tions doctrine” plays an increasingly outsized role.  But the reasons  
Blackman gives in support of this new direction in administrative law 
do not stand up to scrutiny. 
The two executive actions at which Blackman takes aim resulted in 
two of last Term’s High Court fizzles: Zubik v. Burwell3 and United 
States v. Texas.4  The former involved the structures of the exemptions 
and accommodations to the “contraceptive mandate” under the Af-
fordable Care Act5 (ACA); the Court vacated the lower court judg-
ments and remanded the cases with soothing words about the possibil-
ity of a negotiated compromise.  The latter involved the Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans6 (DAPA) immigration-law program; 
the equally divided Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision up-
holding the district court’s injunction preventing implementation of 
the program.  Blackman nicely summarizes the underlying disputes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 † Responding to Josh Blackman, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term — Comment: Gridlock, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 241 (2016). 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  I am grateful to Marty Lederman, Jennifer Nou, 
Catherine Roach, and Jed Stiglitz for helpful and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts.  
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 1 Josh Blackman, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term — Comment: Gridlock, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
241 (2016). 
 2 For my own attempt along those lines, see Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065 (2013). 
 3 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 4 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 5 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). 
 6 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León 
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discre-
tion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to 
Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 4–5 (Nov. 20, 
2014), h t t p s : / / w w w . d h s . g o v / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / p u b l i c a t i o n s / 1 4 _ 1 1 2 0 _ m e m o _ d e f e r r e d _ a c t i o n . p d f  
[ h t t p s : / / p e r m a . c c / 9 3 P G - J H G 5 ] (creating the program that would become the Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)). 
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and the Court’s (lack of) resolution; there is no need to replicate his ef-
forts here.7 
Rather than delving into the underlying substantive law, Blackman 
suggests that “these disputes can be resolved on the more neutral prin-
ciple of whether the agency can take such novel actions in the first in-
stance. . . . These ‘major questions’ should be returned to the political 
process — which is where they should have been decided to begin 
with.”8  Indeed, the core of Blackman’s Comment is a call for a more 
muscular major questions doctrine.  The doctrine originated in Justice 
Scalia’s 1994 opinion in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.,9 
in which he wrote: “It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the 
determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substan-
tially, rate-regulated to agency discretion — and even more unlikely 
that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission 
to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”10  In MCI, the doctrine is best 
understood as a factor at Step One of the Chevron analysis: it goes to 
the “boundary of legitimate agency discretion” as a factor in the de-
termination of whether the statute is, in fact, ambiguous in relevant 
part and therefore deserving of Step Two deference.11  Indeed, before 
getting to the language quoted above, Scalia wrote (citing Chevron), 
“Since an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not entitled to defer-
ence when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear, the 
Commission’s . . . policy can be justified only if it makes a less than 
radical or fundamental change in the Act’s tariff-filing requirement.”12 
But in a series of subsequent cases entirely written by, and largely 
joined by, the conservative bloc of the Court,13 the doctrine moved 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 On Zubik, see Blackman, supra note 1, at 243–54, 275–78; on Texas, see id. at 279–83. 
 8 Id. at 243; see also id. at 242 (“Congress, and not the courts, should lead the debates over 
such profound questions . . . .”). 
 9 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 10 Id. at 231. 
 11 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 613 
n.12 (2009). 
 12 MCI, 512 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted). 
 13 After MCI (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.), 
these cases are (in chronological order): FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); Whitman 
v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (Scalia, J., joined in the major-questions-doctrine 
holding by everyone except Breyer, J.); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined in the major-questions-doctrine holding by Roberts, 
C.J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.). 
  It is interesting to note that, even when most of the members of the majority were from the 
liberal bloc (as in Gonzales and King), the decision applying the major questions doctrine was au-
thored by a member of the conservative bloc.  This may indicate that it was the author’s price for 
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backward to Step Zero of the Chevron analysis — that is, it became a 
question of whether the Chevron framework would apply at all.14  In 
the words of one commentator, the major questions doctrine has come 
to stand for “a general presumption against implied delegation where 
the Court independently determines that the issue was simply too sig-
nificant to be left to the agency.”15  Such issues are therefore taken 
wholly outside of the Chevron framework and reviewed de novo.  As 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in the most recent major-questions-
doctrine case, King v. Burwell,16 a matter “involving billions of dollars 
in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for 
millions of people” constituted “a question of deep ‘economic and politi-
cal significance’ . . . ; had Congress wished to assign that question to an 
agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”17  Accordingly, it was 
the Court’s job “to determine the correct reading” of the statutory lan-
guage,18 not to determine whether the agency’s reading was reasonable. 
In King, after performing the de novo review, the Court came to 
the conclusion that the agency’s reading of the statute was correct; put 
differently, because no deference applied, no other agency interpreta-
tion of the statutory text would have been permissible.  Blackman’s 
version of the doctrine goes significantly further.  The major questions 
doctrine, in his view, obviates the “need for judges to draw . . . difficult 
line[s]” with respect to statutory or constitutional law.19  Whereas the 
King majority used the major questions doctrine to force itself to wres-
tle with the question of how to interpret statutory text correctly, 
Blackman would have courts use his version of the doctrine to prevent 
such close engagement with substantive law.  How?  By returning ma-
jor questions to Congress, “which is where they should have been de-
cided to begin with.”20  In its most extreme version, the Court’s major 
questions doctrine denies deference whenever agencies address “major 
questions.”  Blackman’s major questions doctrine, by contrast, posits 
that some questions are too major ever to be delegated to agencies, full 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
joining a liberal result — the most conservative available option for reaching a liberal result, as it 
were. 
 14 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 15 Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to “Major Questions”: On the Democratic Authori-
ty of Agency Statutory Interpretation 11 (Aug. 4, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), h t t p : / / s s r n . c o m 
/abstract=2818786 [https://perma.cc/E42T-CBRD]; see also Sunstein, supra note 14, at 231–34. 
 16 135 S. Ct. 2480. 
 17 Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444). 
 18 Id. (emphasis added).  It is instructive that the Court’s opinion nowhere cites Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 19 Blackman, supra note 1, at 243. 
 20 Id.; see also id. at 275 (“No doubt the Administration was well-meaning in its determina-
tions, but this was a judgment that should have been made by the wisdom of the crowds in the 
legislature, and not the monolithic Executive.”); id. at 305 (“These are rightfully difficult topics to 
resolve, which are best left for Congress . . . to decide.”). 
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stop.  That is the only way that the doctrine could allow judges to 
avoid addressing questions of substantive law. 
So what are we to make of Blackman’s major questions doctrine 
on steroids?  It is, perhaps, most illuminating to begin with his claim 
that the doctrine is a “neutral principle” — or, at least, is “more neu-
tral” than delving into questions of statutory interpretation or constitu-
tional law.21  The language of “neutral principles” of course gestures 
toward Professor Herbert Wechsler’s famous treatment,22 but the ges-
ture remains indistinct.  Neutrality cannot be free-floating; otherwise 
all principles would fail the test.  (“Apply neutral principles” is decid-
edly nonneutral as between neutral principles and nonneutral princi-
ples.)  For Wechsler, what was required seemed to be neutrality with 
respect to the identity of the litigant: it should not matter to the out-
come whether the claim is “put forward by a labor union or a taxpay-
er, a Negro or a segregationist, a corporation or a Communist.”23  Or, 
as he would much later put it, the judge should ask herself: “Would I 
reach the same result if the substantive interests were otherwise?”24  
Of course, as critics began pointing out almost as soon as his article 
was published, Wechsler’s standard is both insufficiently nuanced and 
immensely difficult to apply.25  Nevertheless, Wechsler clearly under-
stood that “neutrality” had to mean neutrality as between different val-
ues of some variable(s) identified in advance.  A criminal court should 
be neutral as between blonde and brunette defendants; it should not be 
neutral as between innocent and guilty ones. 
So what, exactly, does Blackman think that his major questions 
doctrine is neutral as between?  He is not explicit, but the fact that he 
contrasts it with the courts’ having to confront difficult questions of 
statutory interpretation (of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act26 
(RFRA) or the Immigration and Nationality Act27) or of constitutional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Id. at 243. 
 22 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959). 
 23 Id. at 12. 
 24 Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections from 
the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 925 (1993). 
 25 On the difficulty of application, Wechsler was quickly taken to task for arguing that Brown 
v. Board of Education failed to articulate a neutral principle.  For the most influential examples, 
see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); 
Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).  On the need for more nuance in the standard itself, see, for example, 
Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle 
over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1056–57 (2009) (noting that “there is also a 
wide array of cases in which the identity of a litigant or injured party does matter,” including sen-
tencing and antidiscrimination law). 
 26 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). 
 27 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012). 
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law (with respect to the First Amendment or the scope of executive 
power)28 suggests that he thinks it is more neutral as a matter of sub-
stantive values.  After all, if the act in question fails the major-
questions-doctrine test, then “there is no need for judges to draw th[e] 
difficult line” posed by the statutory and constitutional questions: 
“[t]hese ‘major questions’ should be returned to the political process — 
which is where they should have been decided to begin with.”29  The 
major questions doctrine, then, is figured as institutionally partial, but 
substantively neutral.  (I’ll leave for another day Blackman’s implicit 
claim that the bureaucracy stands outside of “the political process.”30) 
Blackman is right in one regard.  The doctrine is institutionally 
partial — although not quite in the way he imagines.  Begin with what 
ought to be obvious: whether or not a particular question is “major” is 
a political judgment, not a fact about the world.  Blackman suggests 
that, while the caselaw may be convoluted — it “suggests at least nine 
factors, none dispositive, to determine if a decision is major”31 — the 
core of the doctrine at least is clear: “Despite these uncertainties, the 
majorness of the question at issue in Zubik is entirely beyond ques-
tion.”32  Blackman arrives at his majorness-beyond-dispute determina-
tion through a particular framing: “the principles of free exercise, en-
shrined in the First Amendment and RFRA, are of the highest order of 
magnitude. . . . Surely religious freedom is more important to Con-
gress — and to the nation as a whole — than the regulation of 
snuff,”33 a reference to the major-questions-doctrine language in FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,34 which dealt with tobacco 
regulation.  Likewise, “[t]he Women’s Health Amendment [of the ACA] 
vested HHS with authority over the ‘interstitial matters’ of what con-
stitutes preventive care, without addressing the ‘major questions’ of 
how religious objectors should be accommodated.”35  The Department 
was exercising “a great substantive and independent power over free 
exercise,”36 but had “Congress wished to assign that question to an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 See Blackman, supra note 1, at 243 (“My goal in this Comment is not to explain whether 
DAPA complies with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or whether the contraception 
mandate’s accommodation violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See generally JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORI-
TY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS chs. 1, 3 (forthcoming 2017). 
 31 Blackman, supra note 1, at 266. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 267. 
 34 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 35 Blackman, supra note 1, at 269 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of 
Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)). 
 36 Id. 
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agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”37  Indeed, “Congress’s 
silence in the ACA demonstrates that Congress did not intend for the 
agencies to exercise such an awesome power.”38  (Blackman makes 
similar claims about the majorness of DAPA.39) 
One can, for starters, question Blackman’s ipse dixit that the free 
exercise issue in Zubik is “surely” more major than the tobacco issue in 
Brown & Williamson.  After all, in 2000 (when Brown & Williamson 
was decided), just under a quarter of American adults smoked ciga-
rettes,40 and between 2000 and 2004, over 2.2 million American deaths 
were attributable to smoking.41  One might well think that the prema-
ture deaths of a population the size of Houston (the nation’s fourth-
largest city) over a five-year period would be “more major” than the 
burden to the religious practice of a relatively small number of em-
ployers arising out of HHS’s contraceptive mandate under the ACA.  
Or one might not.  The point is that a huge number of federal gov-
ernment programs affect large numbers of people in varied and com-
plex ways.  To reduce this complexity to a single spectrum of 
“majorness” and then assert with the utmost confidence the relative 
positions of various policies on that spectrum is to fall almost immedi-
ately into a querulous quagmire.  And that’s before someone demands 
to know where on this spectrum the cutoff for triggering the major 
questions doctrine is located. 
But, in fact, the problem is even more fundamental.  Above, I ac-
cepted at face value Blackman’s assertion that the “question” at issue 
in Zubik was “the principles of free exercise” or “religious freedom.”  
But this is very much a contestable framing.  As Blackman demon-
strates in some detail, the “contraceptive mandate” arose from HHS’s 
interpretation of the ACA’s requirement that employer-provided insur-
ance plans cover (without additional copayments) “preventive care” for 
women.42  HHS then (presumably to avoid violating RFRA) created a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Id. at 270 (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)). 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at 289 (suggesting that the “acrimony between the branches over a significant na-
tionwide policy that affected millions demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, how major 
this major question was. . . . This policy was designed to effect a foundational change in our im-
migration policy.  Congress ‘does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in 
vague terms or ancillary provisions.’” (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 
468 (2001))). 
 40 Trends in Current Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students and Adults, United 
States, 1965–2014, CDC, h t t p : / / w w w . c d c . g o v / t o b a c c o / d a t a _ s t a t i s t i c s / t a b l e s / t r e n d s / c i g _ s m o k i n g 
(last updated Mar. 30, 2016) [https://perma.cc/23ZN-XL3X]. 
 41 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING — 50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL 677 tbl.12.15 (2014), h t t p : / / w w w . s u r g e o n g e n e r a l . g o v / l i b r a r y / r e p o r t s / 5 0 
-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV9F-AH92]. 
 42 Blackman, supra note 1, at 250–52. 
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structure of exemptions and accommodations for religious employers.43  
Employers who did not like the limitations and structure of those ex-
emptions and accommodations filed suit, leading to the seven cases 
consolidated in Zubik.  Blackman is not wrong to describe the issue 
here as one of religious freedom.  But neither would it be wrong to de-
scribe the issue as one of health care, preventive health care, contra-
ception, health insurance, the scope of the social safety net, reproduc-
tive rights, sex equality, etc.  All of these are plausible frames on the 
same set of facts.  And, depending on the substantive values one 
brings to the table, some of these issues may seem “major” and others 
not.  Indeed, Blackman argues that the ACA “vested HHS with au-
thority over the ‘interstitial matters’ of what constitutes preventive 
care, without addressing the ‘major questions’ of how religious objec-
tors should be accommodated”44 — in other words, the rule was minor, 
but its exception was major.  This is certainly possible, but it is by no 
means obviously correct. 
And this brings us back to the institutional question.  If the 
“majorness” of a question is necessarily a matter of (a) how that ques-
tion is framed, and (b) what substantive values one understands as in-
dicia of “majorness,” then the major questions doctrine empowers 
whoever gets to make those (necessarily normative) determinations.  
Blackman gives us a parenthetical hint of whom that might be: “Jus-
tice Kennedy has been in the majority of each major question doctrine 
case.”45  The major questions doctrine aggrandizes judges, who decide 
in any given case both how to frame the issue and how important that 
issue is.  As Professor Lisa Heinzerling explains, far from empowering 
Congress, the doctrine actually “aggrandize[s] the courts at the expense 
of Congress and the executive” by “chang[ing] the ground rules of stat-
utory interpretation after the other branches have acted, upsetting the 
reliance the other branches may have placed in the pre-existing inter-
pretive regime and yet not replacing that regime with stable and pre-
dictable rules that could foster reliance moving forward.”46  The point 
is not simply that there is a transitional period of uncertainty; it is that 
the uncertainty is indefinite because the doctrine does no more than 
tell judges not to defer to agencies when the actions taken by those 
agencies are, in the view of those judges, a big deal.  And, of course, 
Blackman’s version of the doctrine would go even further: instead of 
telling judges to withhold deference, it would tell them to vacate the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Id. at 252–54. 
 44 Id. at 269 (quoting Breyer, supra note 35, at 370). 
 45 Id. at 265. 
 46 Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manu-
script at 48), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757770 [https://perma.cc/MX7Q-8JZB]. 
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administrative action whenever that action was, in their view, a big 
deal. 
And what do the judges do with this power?  The answer, it turns 
out, undercuts Blackman’s claim that the doctrine is substantively 
neutral.  The major questions doctrine partakes of what Professors 
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have termed “libertarian adminis-
trative law” — that is to say, “a form of administrative law that . . . 
invokes, implicitly or explicitly, libertarian goals to give a kind of strict 
scrutiny to agency decisions.”47  As Heinzerling notes, the major ques-
tions doctrine “require[s] clear congressional language to enable an 
ambitious regulatory agenda, but not to disable one.  This asymmetry 
is the [doctrine’s] tell; it is the sign that [it] mask[s] a judicial agenda 
hostile to a robust regulatory state.”48  To be clear, a judge need not be 
consciously seeking libertarian outcomes for this to be the case: action 
is generally more salient than inaction,49 so it should not be surprising 
that a move to regulate would seem “major,” while nonregulation and 
deregulation both seem more minor.  Consider what Blackman has to 
say about the contraceptive mandate: “There was a really, really easy 
way to avoid the Zubik controversy in the first place.  The executive 
branch could have simply rejected the Institute of Medicine’s determi-
nation and excluded contraceptives from the definition of ‘preventive 
care.’”50  It turns out that not regulating is always a “really, really easy 
way” to avoid falling prey to the major questions doctrine.51  HHS’s 
regulations embodied “policy-laden judgments,”52 but apparently not 
issuing those regulations would have been the sound judgment to 
avoid policymaking — at least, it would have constituted the avoid-
ance of major policymaking. 
It is, perhaps, worth pausing to note here that, even in the absence 
of any major questions doctrine at all, agencies would hardly have 
carte blanche.  As Sunstein has noted, “Chevron deference does not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
393, 400 (2015).  To be clear: Sunstein and Vermeule do not discuss the major questions doctrine 
in their article, but it clearly fits within their framework. 
 48 Heinzerling, supra note 46 (manuscript at 1–2). 
 49 See Kathleen C. McCulloch et al., Naïve Definitions of Action and Inaction: The Continu-
um, Spread, and Valence of Behaviors, 42 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 227, 228 (2012); Ran Spiegler, 
Placebo Reforms, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1490, 1491 (2013); Marcel Zeelenberg et al., The Inaction 
Effect in the Psychology of Regret, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 314, 316 (2002). 
 50 Blackman, supra note 1, at 251. 
 51 It is worth noting that Blackman’s “solution” may simply have created a different problem.  
As Professor Jennifer Nou has noted, “courts have . . . critically viewed agency rejections of expert 
advisory committee opinions, especially when those opinions are required by statute, and con-
versely have regarded careful consideration of concerns raised by such committees favorably.”  
Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1833–
34 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
 52 Blackman, supra note 1, at 254. 
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give agencies a blank check.  It remains the case that agency decisions 
must not violate clearly expressed legislative will, must represent  
reasonable interpretations of statutes, and must not be arbitrary in  
any way.”53  The major questions doctrine adds an additional layer: 
when it is triggered, judges will not accord the administrative action  
Chevron deference at all (in the Court’s version) or they will vacate the 
action on sight (in Blackman’s more extreme version).  But if non-
regulation and deregulation receive Chevron deference (or stronger54) 
as a matter of course, while regulation receives it only if judges deter-
mine that the regulation does not address a topic of “major” concern, 
then the doctrine is putting a thumb on the scale against regulation.55  
This is not a substantively neutral doctrine, even in the Court’s com-
paratively modest version. 
In the Comment’s only real nod to its ostensible topic, Blackman 
attempts to justify this thumb on the scale in terms of status-quo bias: 
“Gridlock does not license the expansion of the executive’s power.  
Under our system of government, there is only one way to decide ma-
jor questions, as difficult as it may be in our gridlocked polity.  In the 
absence of consensus, the status quo remains.”56  It is true that status-
quo bias is a feature of any plausible political system,57 but Blackman 
is mistaken to view the major questions doctrine as an agent of the sta-
tus quo, full stop.  After all, the doctrine only has bite if, under the 
normal rules (that is, Chevron), a court would determine that Congress 
had, in fact, delegated adequate authority to the agency to take the ac-
tion in question.  The doctrine comes in to forestall the Chevron analy-
sis, instituting a special, status-quo-protecting norm only in cases in 
which the court deems a “major question” to be present.  Because, as 
we have seen, judges are far more likely to find major questions in 
cases of active regulation, rather than nonregulation or deregulation, 
the doctrine privileges only nonregulatory baselines, while allowing for 
regulatory ones to be rolled back more easily. 
There may well be a justification for a doctrine of administrative 
law that is institutionally partial towards the judiciary and substan-
tively partial towards deregulatory outcomes.  But neutrality is not it, 
and Blackman has not offered an alternative. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 Sunstein, supra note 14, at 233. 
 54 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (finding “that an agency’s decision not to 
take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under” the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, id. at 832). 
 55 In Heinzerling’s evocative phrase, a “big, grumpy thumb on the scales.”  Heinzerling, supra 
note 46 (manuscript at 2). 
 56 Blackman, supra note 1, at 303. 
 57 See Chafetz, supra note 2, at 2073 & n.54. 
